01 / THE HUMAN COST
The disaster comes first.
On November 21, 1980, fire broke out in the original MGM Grand’s delicatessen and spread through the casino. Smoke reached the hotel tower. The federal court’s account describes failures of containment and escape that turned a localized fire into a mass catastrophe. [1]
Survivors carried its effects long after leaving Las Vegas. In their twentieth-anniversary reporting, Ed Koch and Mary Manning followed Marv and Carol Schatzman, who endured lasting health problems and campaigned for stronger fire protections in Missouri. Their story belongs alongside the corporate and legal history. [2]
Why death tolls differ: UPI’s 1985 report gives 85. The 1983 court order records 84 deaths at the scene and three more within a year. Those sources use different counts; this file preserves the distinction. [3] [1]
02 / KERKORIAN’S RESPONSE
“The victims were our guests.”
The clearest expression of Kerkorian’s priorities comes through his longtime attorney Terry Christensen. In William C. Rempel’s biography The Gambler, Christensen recalled Kerkorian saying:
“We aren’t fighting them. We’re on their side.”
That is a recollection, rather than a recorded statement from 1980. It conveys the humane principle that makes Kerkorian’s response worth studying: seek compensation for the guests, then pursue the insurance dispute.
Attorney William Shernoff told the Las Vegas Sun in 2000 that Kerkorian used his own money to pay remaining victims before suing the insurers. Shernoff represented MGM, so his praise is a participant’s testimony. The court order establishes the company’s settlement obligation; it does not independently itemize Kerkorian’s personal contributions. [2] [1]
The people who carried it through
MGM president Al Benedict also played a central role. Ed Koch’s 2014 obituary describes his approval of post-fire insurance and his dispatch of attorneys to negotiate with claimants when insurer negotiations slowed. Shernoff’s account credits co-counsel Patricia Glaser with leading MGM’s corporate legal team in the insurance case. [5] [6]
The response deserves recognition on its documented merits. It sits within a history that also includes the resort’s safety failures and the lives lost.
03 / THE UNUSUAL POLICY
Yes, MGM bought insurance after the fire.
The fire was already known; the eventual liability and payment timetable remained uncertain. Shernoff explained that insurers expected investment earnings on a substantial premium while claims were resolved. [6]
The federal order identifies $170 million in retroactive coverage. UPI’s April 1, 1985 report puts its premiums at about $38.5 million and says insurers resisted reimbursement after MGM settled victims’ claims in 1983, arguing that the company paid too much, too quickly. [1] [3]
Later accounts sometimes describe $120 million of coverage and roughly $40 million in premiums. We retain those accounts as testimony but use the contemporary court record for coverage and UPI for its reported premium. The differences are unresolved; these figures should not be silently combined.
04 / A COURTROOM AT UNLV
The case outgrew the courtroom.
A special courtroom was constructed inside UNLV’s Thomas & Mack Center for MGM’s dispute with its insurers. This was the later reimbursement case. [6] [3]
Shernoff recalled Judge Paul Goldman requiring contributions from the parties to create a $150,000 construction fund. So many attorneys attended that identifying signs hung above their stations. His memoir also credits Glaser’s preparation and Goldman’s firm management of the proceedings. [6]
The Sun reported that litigants financed the trial arrangements. UPI reported a settlement announcement on March 31, 1985, four days before the planned trial. The story is of an arena adapted for an enormous case—not a separate civic courthouse donated by Kerkorian. [2] [3]
05 / FOLLOWING THE MONEY
Different figures. Different obligations.
Victim compensation and reimbursement by insurers were separate transactions. These amounts describe different stages of the litigation.
| Amount | What it represents |
|---|---|
| $75 million | MGM’s January 1983 victim-settlement commitment, payable in installments. [1] |
| $69 million | The court’s estimated present value of that same commitment. It is not an additional payment. [1] |
| $170 million | Retroactive coverage, rather than a settlement paid to victims. [1] |
| $76 million | New insurance-settlement payments reported by UPI in 1985: $67 million plus $9 million in later installments, with interest on those installments. [3] |
| $87.5 million | UPI’s total including the $76 million above and $11.5 million already paid. [3] |
These are selected figures, not a total for every defendant, claimant or property-damage dispute. A settlement is not a verdict absolving an owner or deciding every allegation.
06 / THE LASTING OBLIGATION
A history of responsibility.
The Sun traced the disaster’s influence on stronger sprinkler and smoke-protection requirements, as well as the work of survivors and fire officials. That wider legacy gives the settlement story its meaning: money could compensate losses, but safety reforms addressed the responsibility to future guests and workers. [2]